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Petty producers in Dakar are by no means a
homogeneous element in the urban complex of
production processesa factor which has led to
methodological errors being made in the
approach to their study. The different strata of
petty producers relate in different ways to the
dominant forms of production and distribution,
making the problem of analysis doubly difficult,
but such difficulties recede considerably if the
main thrust of the analysis deals with relation-
ships rather than characteristics.
The blanket term 'petty producer' comprises
artisans producing for individual clients as well
as others who deal almost exclusively with the
market. Irrespective of these differences, many
petty producers must deal either directly or
indirectly with the products and/or services of
capitalist industry and commerce. Most petty
producers depend upon such enterprises for access
to their raw materials, acquisition of machinery
and tools, and in many other minor ways. This
proposition may sound facile, yet its significance
is great, not merely in terms of dependence but
also in terms of market-shares (where mutually
interesting markets exist), and technical change.
In order to subsist or accumulate it is necessary
to have some relationship with forms of produc-
tion and appropriation extremely different from
those in which one operates oneself; thus the
dominant system has considerable ability co
shape and restrict the activities of dependent
sub-systems. That such sub-systems often appear
to differ considerably from one another merely
reflects the nature of the structural relationships
in which they are involved. Hence markets in
which petty production and distribution pre-
dominate are likely to be those in which it would
be unprofitable for large-scale industry and/or
commerce to engage. The symbiosis between petty
and industrial production does not exclude the
possibility of the penetration of industrial markets
by the former's products; nevertheless, it
militates severely against it at all levels, including
the administrative.' Additionally, since large
sections of petty production depend upon articles
and materials which are discarded by industrial
or ancillary processes, changes in the latter's
technology, form, or even its overall viability,
have considerable effects upon dependent
branches of petty production, to which industry
feels no responsibility, if indeed it is aware of
the relationship.
Petty production in its various forms depends
upon capitalist industry and commerce to
produce and, often, distribute the materials and
equipment it requires; this 'dependence' originates
in the quasi-monopolisation of these productive
and distributive sub-processes by large and
medium-size industry and commerce. In Senegal
a multinational corporation currently produces
large quantities of leather shoes, for which it
depends upon local raw materials; it also benefits
from state protection, whereas the petty
producers do not. Certainly 'modernisation' has
involved considerable changes for the craftsman
cobbler, though his current use of plastic rather
than traditional leather has usually been heralded
as proof either of initiative or of his modernisation
mentality, rather than the defensive action of
dispersed, unorganised, relatively poor yet
tenacious craftsmen responding to extensive
encroachment upon their traditional markets.
There are two inextricably connected trends
within the evolution of petty production and its
external relationships; these relate to the con-
tinuing process of differentiation among petty
producers. Some manage to obtain certain
relations through small contracts or sub-contracts
with medium or large commercial or industrial
units. Similar changes in the operations of petty
producers may evolve through their organisation
by the State, involving the direct insertion of a
particular individual or group in a network of
relations dominated by capitalist industry and
commerce, often amounting to the loss of all
but formal control of their own process of
I A report or, the 1968 Situation of certain firms was prepared(or an interministerial counci.l meeting of the Senegalese
government and stated "The increase in competition in foreign
market,, and the competition from local secret and iUegal
production of shoe-soles (using independent piece-workers for
the cutting of rubber and foam) has led BA'rA to ask f
a revision of the protection agreement from which it currently
benefits" (Le Brun 1973).
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production; relative independence is exchanged
for wage-labour. While the pretence of autonomy
is kept up by both sides, the petty producer not
only gets much of his materials and equipment
from capitalist producers and merchants, but sells
a part or all of his production to similar (though
not the same) firms. A survey undertaken in
Dakar in 1974 indicated that the number of petty
producers dealing in some appreciable way with
large firms was quite small; this is to be expected
for many reasons.
Industrialisation in underdeveloped countries has
not led to the establishment of the many back-
ward and forward commercial linkages that it
has in the now-developed regions of the world.
Industrialisation has been partial and even though
its influence is pervasive, it has affected only
limited areas. Much of it has been externally
oriented, supplying a particular metropolitan
country or bloc of countries with basic raw
materials, foodstuffs or manufactures. More
recently, a part of the industrial system has been
geared towards the production of commodities
either for the maintenance of the administrative
and industrial structures required by all aspects
of the externally-oriented sector, or for the
production of goods and services largely
benefiting a privileged minority of the population.
Hence industry has a limited scope as well as a
distorted orientation in most underdeveloped
countries; one would not expect there to be much
scope for petty producers to graft themselves
onto this structure, given that the indigenous
owner of wealth faces limitations on where he
can profitably invest. The structure of industry
permits little competition, hence enterprises which
are intermediate both in size and role proliferate,
while projects and potential investments
outside the existing structure of industry remain
unrealised.
The second and predominant trend nvo1ves the
impoverishment of the mass of petty producers
who are progressively prohibited from access to
the raw materials, equipment and techniques
necessary to earn even a basic urban-subsistence
income. A study of petty producers in Dakar,
conducted in 1973-74, showed that most of those
who linked themselves through the market with
large commercial or industrial firms achieved
little progress. Only exceptional cases (comprising
2 to 3 per cent of the sample), through a long
process of building up personal and business
relationships and fulfilling basic economic and
administrative criteria, had advanced appreciably;
however, this constitutes a weak and numerically
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insignificant 'positive' trend. Most petty producers
appear to be on quite another 'ladder', the bottom
rungs of which become more crowded each
year. Obviously, quantitative measures of this
situation must be treated with the utmost care;
the subjective income figures for petty producers
were around the level one would have expected-
on average little different from the SMIG, the
statutory industrial minimum rate of pay.
Incomes were in many cases, however, much
lower than this. The average artisan shoemaker!
repairer, working alone, had an income ranging
from one third to one half of the SMIG.
However, the qualitative data were much more
illuminating: the general opinion was that there
was a crushing lack of work. This reflected the
degree of competition, the poverty of their
clients, the limited and expensive access to raw
materials, equipment and services, and the state
of 'recession' in which many considered them-
selves to be. Many of the petty producers
interviewed appeared to have the characteristics
of the stereotype underemployed man. However,
this term should be used with caution; 'under-
employed' really indicates that the dominant
form of activityindustrial productionhas no
direct need for the vast majority of petty
producers. Directly, industry deals with its usual,
relatively stable labour-force, plus a fluctuating
number of casual workers some of whom may be
petty producers at other times. There exists an
indirect relationship between petty and industrial
production inasmuch as petty producers provide
not only many of the commodities necessary for
the maintenance of the industrial labour-force,
but also casual workers themselves, at a relatively
low price (at much lower than industry could
or would be prepared to produce). Thus petty
producers contribute to both cheapening the cost
of labour to industry and reducing the cost of
reproducing labour-power. However, when the
characteristic types of productive activity and the
relationships these activities have with the
dominant forms of industrial production and
commercial distribution are put into their objec-
tive context, it is clear that if the term 'under-
employed' must be used at all, it should be used
as a verb indicating a lack of direct functionality
vis-à-vis the dominant capitalist mode of produc-
tion rather than to describe petty producers in
terms of individual characteristics, i.e., an
inability to make productive use of available
working-time.
In terms only of their own type of activity and
organisation, however, petty producers could be
described as 'underemployed': there are relatively
too many of them compared with the demand
(in terms of popular bargaining power) for their
products, and hence most of them suffer from a
shortage of remunerative work. In terms of the
other main form of productive activity, namely
capitalist industry and commerce, they also
appear to be 'underemployed', since the meagre
backward linkages which exist are not commen-
surate with the large numbers of active petty
producers, nor are such linkages particularly
valuablc in terms of the growth of the markets
capitalist industry serves. 'When the status of
petty producers is judged within the context of
the relations existing between themselves and the
industrialised urban economy, 'underemployment'
can be seen in its true light, as a dualistic concept
measuring the performance of petty producers
according to criteria which only logically apply
outside this restricted framework, and which
ignore the relationships which give rise to
phenomena usually rationalised as 'under-
employment'.
A case-study of urban casual workers in Senegal
showed that casual work in industry enables some
of the less successful petty producers to supple-
ment their insufficient incomes; it is not common,
however, for petty producers to engage both in
commodity production and wage-labour on an
equal basis simultaneously, though combinations
of wage-labour, individual production, com-
mercial and other activities are commonly found
among poorer urban inhabitants. Casual labour
offers some income-earning opportunities to
recent migrants until independent producing or
trading opportunities arise, or disillusionment
pushes the migrant back to his home village, or
induces him to try elsewhereanother town,
another country, or even Europe. Nevertheless,
there are many who have made a 'career' of
casual work. Most of them live in the poorer
districts of the city and have dependents who
may contribute little or nothing to their own
upkeep. However, many casual workers have
additional sources of income: monthly earnings
are quite small, frequently paid by the day, and
often indirectly. Most casual workers are un-
skilled, and those who previously received some
training did not necessarily exercise those skills
in the employment they eventually found.
The situation is obviously more complex for the
petty producer who also sells his labour-power
in industrial employment. Bettelheim (1972: 287-8)
flotes that:
"at the economic level itself, wages are subject
to determination both by variations in the
productivity of labour and by non-capitalist
production relations. Within a complex social
formation, such relations may indeed be
combined with capitalist production relations.
This is so, in a way that is particularly
significant . . . in the under-industrialised
countries, where many wage-earners are not
pure wage-earners' ('freed' from their means of
production) but are involved in other than
capitalist relations of production. In cases like
this, wages are often 'supplementary income'
(which means that the relation between wages
and the cost of reproducing labour-power is
modified), for the worker's subsistence is partly
based on relations of production that are other
than capitalist."
Though he has in mind the more specific case
of wage-workers who also engage in agricultural
activities outside the capitalist mode of produc-
tion, his comments are equally applicable to
casual workers in capitalist industry who derive
additional income from other, largely non-
capitalist, sources such as petty production.
Casual labour provides a cheap and expendable
source of labour, ensuring that upward pressure
on wages is limited by a large and visible labour
supply. The wages of casual workers, like those
of regular industrial employees, constitute a
useful transfer of potential purchasing power
into the city's poorer districts. Lastly, this floating
labour-force frightens, chastens or disillusions
both petty producers on the one hand, for petty
producers is what they may become, and
industrial employees on the other, since a claim
to employment-stability is all that separates them
from their less fortunate workmates.
The contemporary situation, of petty production
has serious consequences for both internal and
external attempts to organise and transform it
so that it can participate fully in the process of
development. Strategies for such 'promotion'
involve a clear political option, to be placed
squarely on the shoulders of the State. Within
the current situation of externally-oriented, under-
developed countries, petty production cannot
participate in any other way but a dependent
and subordinate one (with the exception of the
minority who succeed in relative terms in
accumulating capital, capturing markets and
establishing contractual relations and thereby
moving out of petty production). If a country
relies to a large extent upon imports to supply
its industry (which in most cases merely engages
in the production of consumption articles of a
relatively luxury status, and is largely dominated
by foreign capital) relatively unprofitable
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activities are left to such groups as the Lebanese
in commerce or, to a much larger extent, to
petty producers. The ILO report on Kenya
(1972: 94, 505), while failing to draw the correct
conclusions, did point out that the growth of
petty production tends to be predominantly
involutionary. State promotional schemes which
'cream off' a small number of petty producers
for 'development' and discriminatory advance-
ment, either in order to create viable small indus-
trial enterprises, or to give the impression that
transition is taking place in order to placate petty
producers, ignore the causes of the problem,
and fail to help those who most need assistance.
Indeed, petty producers who are non-recipients
of state promotion frequently allege that the
State helps those who are already a long way
along the road to small industrial production.
Attempts by the State to encourage the evolution
of small industries indicate some appreciation of
the fact that some petty producers are able to
expand even without aid. Apparently the problem
is considered remediable, since much of
the promotion undertaken in underdeveloped
countries involves giving access to otherwise
inaccessible credit facilities, guarantees, machinery
and materials, and advice on management and
book-keeping. Little importance appears to be
given to the aggregate repercussions of such
schemes: when lip-service is paid to such
considerations, it is based upon a dualistic
conception of the urban economy, hence the
problems remain susceptible to marginal
'tinkering'.
Initially the State usually decides whether to give
much to the 'chosen few' or a little to virtually
everyone, usually opting for the former. Visitors
and potential investors see the prestige coopera-
tives and small factories benefiting from state
promotion and rarely visit the workshops of those
who remain unaided. State preoccupation with
the success of promoted enterprises may entail
discriminatory treatment which severely handicaps
the non-beneficiaries of state promotion. In open
economies, this may not prevent promoted firms
from falling victim to larger, local and/or foreign
enterprises, whose expansionary strategies are
not restricted by small budgets.
Another means by which the State can 'involve'
small indigenoLls enterprises ir! the transactions
of the advanced industrial sector, is by offering
contracts for conimodities the State wishes to
procure. But the administrative criteria for
acceptance by the State as a registered contractor
niay militate against certain small enterprises
which, by their very nature, cannot fulfill the
necessary conditions. Yet these marginal problems
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remain merely administrative details to be
smoothed out; serious changes have to be made
if individual 'entrepreneurs', owners of accumu-
lated wealth, are not to take advantage of their
privileged position by acting as brokers of such
contracts with the State, thus siphoning off the
much-needed revenues of petty producers through
subcontracting systems and reducing such inde-
pendent craftsmen to temporary hired labourers.
Hence the problems of positive state intervention
are manifold and have wide repercussions. If
promotional strategies for small-scale production
are formulated without regard to the interests
of self-centred and self-sustained growth, no real
and positive change in the life-conditions of
small-scale producers will be possible. In this
context, we must inevitably pose the question
"What type of evolution of petty production is
compatible with an autonomous development
strategy?" Due to the highly competitive nature
of most petty production (including the provision
of services), and the quasi-monopolistic nature
of many of the sources of inputs, even if a small
number of petty producers were able to evolve
into petty capitalists with the provision of state
aid, the almost inevitable outcome would be a
more or less rapid concentration and differentia-
tion of relative power, capacity, and production
within the small-scale sector as opposed to the
current situation of quasi-perfect competition. It
is probable that certain petty producers who are
non-beneficiaries of state promotion may find
wage-work in the successfully promoted firms
more remunerative than self-employed produc-
tion. The majority, however, would be unable to
find such work. Economies of scale and state
promoted differentiation and discrimination would
reduce access to raw materials and lower their
market-share, thus worsening their situation. Some
individuals and their families would benefit
through employment effects, but the aggregate
effect on productive employment would probably
be negative. The majority of petty producers
would find themselves less able either to
reproduce their contemporary situation or
maintain an already meagre clientele, and would
be driven towards that fringe of petty production
which almost exclusively depends upon discarded
raw materials, recuperation, and the poorest
possible clients. Promotion of this sort would not
only tend to compound existing economic and
social difficulties, but would also intensify the
rate of impoverishment and 'marginalisation',
unless a massive programme of industrialisation
and/or employment expansion were able to
absorb those petty producers whose activities had
become unviable.
The crucial question, given this evaluation of
çurrent trends, relates to ways in which the
present linkages might be transformed such that
the devastating results outlined above might be
avoided. Can existing relationships be used, or
must they be transformed? Three general options
are available: 1. the laissez-faire approach,
permitting uncontrolled and little understood
processes to continue their 'natural' course;
the promotional approach already inIicated,
'creaming off' selected enterprises for transforma-
tion and launching into capitalist activities, more
or less irrespective of their proposed milieu, and
positive promotion coupled with a thorough-
going and global reappraisal of the economic
system in which small-scale activities, and their
probable successors (cooperative production
units, etc.), might contribute and share in a real
process of economic, social and cultural develop-
ment based largely on the economy's orientation
towards economic independence and self-centred
development and growth.
The laissez-faire approach appeals simultaneously
to policy-makers who either have an extreme
dualist conception of the nature and operation of
the urban and, indeed, national economy or a
rather paternalist and romantic idea that artisanry
is something which should be preserved, rather
like an ancient monument, regardless of its
position in the economy. Neither of these types
of policy-maker believes the economy to be
susceptible to structural change, even when such
changes are so clearly required for the mass of
the working population to participate in the sort
of development outlined above.
The approach which selectively promotes a
minority of already 'transitional' production
units, so that they can successfully establish
themselves at some level in the urban capitalist
productive and/or distributive system, suffers
from the same misconceptions as the laissez-faire
approach, but actually and legally worsens the
situation, not by forinalising the informal sector
but by actively increasing the degree of
differentiation between productive units outside
the capitalist production process at the very
point where transition starts to evolve. This makes
autonomous evolution in that direction unlikely
if not impossible, thus placing control of the rate
and nature of this evolution in the hands of
the government, its advisors, and the heads of
industry in the area. Hence this policy cuts off
the mass of the urban petty producers from the
means of maintaining their present situation, and
conclusively debars all but a favoured and
carefully selected few from evolution towards
the establishment of more productive and
remunerative activities.
Consequently, the usefulness of the existing
linkages in improving the situation of petty
producers becomes more and more doubtful: the
remaining question poses the problem of trans-
forming the present linkages and relationships in
such a way that an all-inclusive development of
production and distribution, involving and
benefiting all sections of the population might
take place. In order that this problem might
even be considered, it is essential that a
reappraisal of the operation of the entire economy
be made with a view to orienting policy-making
towards these concepts of development, and away
from policies which merely reinforce the domina-
tion of interests and considerations irrelevant and
alien to such development. in order that
promotion, as one policy of transformation of
petty production, might work, the relations
between petty and industrial production must be
clearly understood; where existing relationships
conflict with or retard the realisation of popular
development objectives, the relationships should
be positively transformed. The nature of such
changes will be governed by the situation in
question, and not by any textbook list of criteria
or plan of action, though we may well learn
valuable lessons from the strategies already
undertaken in or planned for countries which
have taken a socialist road to development.
The question of the concrete policy-
recommendations to fit specific cases is too
complex and important a field to be dealt with
in detail here, It may be worth mentioning,
however, that in certain countries, Nigeria for
example, small-scale production is being
promoted (albeit selectively, and in this sense no
differently from the Senegalese case) through the
government transfer of surplus from multi-
national corporations to promotion projects.
When foreign capital has an important stake in
another sector of the economy (e.g., oil or whole-
sale commerce), it may be prepared to pander
to the 'development'-oriented whims of the
government in question. But what hope have the
less well-endowed economies like Senegal of
realising such transfers? Bourgeois theories of
the nature and operation of the 'emergent'
economy have)argely determined policy for all
forms of change in underdeveloped countries
and yet the results have generally been far from
encouraging in terms of the life-conditions of
the mass of the population. What is required to
replace such policies must emerge from new
15
forms of political, as well as economic, organisa-
tion based on the productive and efficient use of
the labour-force for the labour-force.
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